International relations and external image management
Saudi Arabia’s external environment under MbS is mixed: the kingdom has experienced periods of sharp tension with key partners and neighbors (the war in Yemen, the rift with Qatar, the Khashoggi affair, and episodic friction with the United States and European states), but more recently has shifted toward diplomatic de-escalation. Steps include rapprochement with Qatar, talks and normalization of relations with Iran, and more pragmatic engagement with regional issues. Riyadh also seeks balanced ties with global powers (United States, China, Russia, and the EU), using energy policy and investment as tools of influence. Vision 2030 depends heavily on foreign capital, technology, and tourism, so the leadership invests in reputation management, including large-scale sports and cultural initiatives, which are debated internationally as instances of “sportswashing” or strategic branding. While these controversies and human rights concerns create reputational strain and periodic diplomatic friction, they fall short of a sustained system-level crisis in foreign relations. Overall, tensions in international relations are mild to moderate, driven more by reputational and normative disputes than by large-scale interstate conflict or isolation.
Media environment, public discourse, and information control
Saudi Arabia maintains a highly controlled media and digital information environment, particularly on political, religious, and royal-family matters. Under MbS, traditional media outlets and major social media voices generally align with official narratives, with red lines around criticism of the leadership, foreign policy, and security institutions. The state employs legal instruments (counterterrorism and cybercrime laws), surveillance capacity, and informal pressures to deter dissent. High-profile cases, such as the killing of Jamal Khashoggi and the detention of online activists and clerics, have had a chilling effect across the media sphere. At the same time, the government uses social media and state-aligned influencers aggressively to promote Vision 2030, project an image of openness, and counter criticism. This produces a paradoxical environment: expanding cultural expression and lifestyle content alongside tightly restricted political speech. Tensions in this domain are severe, as basic norms of open public debate and press freedom are heavily constrained despite the absence of widespread street unrest. The media environment thus reflects systemic crisis-level pressure on independent discourse, even if this has not translated into mass mobilization.
Political openness and elite–society polarization
Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) remains an absolute monarchy with limited formal avenues for political participation. While there is no legal political opposition or electoral competition that would produce classic partisan polarization, there is a pronounced tension between rapid, top-down transformation and the absence of institutionalized dissent. MbS’s centralization of power, the sidelining of other royal factions, and the arrest or intimidation of clerics, businessmen, activists, and even royal family members since 2017 have reduced overt elite competition but increased latent polarization within segments of the elite and politically engaged citizens. Public debate is constrained by legal and security pressures, which keeps visible conflict relatively low but raises underlying tensions and the potential for sharper polarization if economic outcomes disappoint or repression eases. This combination of strong control, rapid policy change, and limited formal channels for disagreement places Saudi Arabia above a low-tension environment, though still short of open crisis.
Social change, cultural tensions, and generational divides
The Vision 2030 agenda and MbS’s personal leadership have accelerated social liberalization: expanded entertainment sectors, mixed-gender spaces, a relaxation of certain dress and segregation norms, and a reduced role for the religious police. These reforms resonate with many younger urban Saudis, especially in Riyadh and Jeddah, and have generated a sense of dynamism and new opportunities. At the same time, they create tensions with more conservative segments of society, including parts of the religious establishment and older generations who perceive a rapid erosion of long-standing norms. Public religious actors who voice criticism face sanctions, which contains visible opposition but does not eliminate underlying discomfort. Migrant workers and Shi’a communities continue to face structural inequalities and security-driven constraints, which can exacerbate sectarian and socio-economic frictions, particularly in the Eastern Province. Overall social order remains intact, but the speed and scope of transformation, guided closely by MbS, generate significant but managed social tension rather than low-level, routine adjustment.
Social stability and regime security
On most indicators, Saudi Arabia appears socially stable: there are no widespread protests, insurgencies, or routine mass violence, and the state maintains effective coercive and surveillance capacities. Key pillars of regime stability—control over security institutions, patronage networks tied to oil revenues, and the monarchy’s religious and national legitimacy—remain intact. MbS has reinforced regime security through purges framed as anti-corruption, consolidation of security agencies, and a narrative of national renewal under Vision 2030. However, this stability is partly contingent on continued economic performance, success in diversification, and effective management of regional threats. The memory of past terrorism and unrest in the Eastern Province, combined with regional instability (Yemen, Iran–Saudi rivalry), mean that authorities remain highly security-oriented. Tensions are therefore moderate rather than minimal: the system is stable in day-to-day terms but reliant on sustained repression and resource distribution, and vulnerable to potential shocks such as a prolonged oil price downturn or external conflict escalation.
Trust in institutions and state–society relations
Trust in core state institutions—particularly the monarchy, security services, and bureaucracy—appears relatively high among many citizens, supported by expanded public services, employment programs, and large-scale infrastructure and entertainment projects associated with MbS’s leadership. MbS cultivates an image of a decisive, modernizing ruler personally driving reform and tackling corruption, which resonates with some younger and professional classes. However, this trust coexists with constrained civil liberties, limited transparency, and a weak rule-of-law environment in politically sensitive cases. High-profile detentions of activists, journalists, business figures, and even senior royals, often without transparent legal process, can erode confidence among elites and politically aware citizens in the predictability of institutions. The lack of independent judiciary, elected national legislature, and robust civil society also means that institutional trust is heavily personalized around MbS and the royal court. Accordingly, tensions in state–society relations are mild to moderate: broad acceptance and pragmatic support are evident, but trust is contingent and personalized rather than deeply institutionalized.