Civil Liberties, Protest Dynamics, and Media Environment
Indonesia maintains a relatively pluralistic media and an active civil society, but under Jokowi there has been rising concern about shrinking civic space and pressures on dissent. Traditional media are influenced by powerful business–political conglomerates, and critical investigative journalism coexists with pervasive infotainment and occasional self-censorship on sensitive political–economic topics. Online, Indonesia’s large social media user base allows for vibrant discourse but also facilitates disinformation and organized opinion shaping, including so-called cyber troops or buzzer networks often alleged to be linked to political actors. Protest activity—such as demonstrations against the KPK law revisions, labor law reforms (the Omnibus Law), or the new Criminal Code—has been met at times with firm policing and the use of legal instruments (e.g., the ITE law) that critics argue can chill free expression. However, open protest remains possible and frequent, newspapers and online outlets continue to publish a wide range of views, and broad censorship or systematic repression is absent. Overall pressures on civil liberties are noticeable and debated but not yet at a level of pervasive fear or shutdown of dissenting voices.
Democratic Quality, Rule of Law, and Trust in Institutions
Indonesia remains an electoral democracy with regular, competitive elections and a degree of pluralism, but concerns about democratic backsliding and institutional integrity have become more pronounced in Jokowi’s second term. Confidence in core institutions—parliament, parties, and the judiciary—is mixed; many Indonesians express pride in democratic procedures while simultaneously perceiving high levels of corruption and oligarchic influence. Key controversies include revisions to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) law that were widely seen as weakening the body, changes to the Criminal Code criticized by civil-society groups as restricting civil liberties, and, most prominently, the Constitutional Court’s decision that enabled Jokowi’s son to stand as vice-presidential candidate despite age limits—raising allegations of conflicts of interest and eroding perceptions of judicial independence. While institutions still function and there has not been a breakdown in constitutional order, these developments have generated significant debate about the quality and impartiality of governance. The tension lies less in immediate unrest and more in the long-term legitimacy of institutions, with Jokowi’s leadership often at the center of debates about whether Indonesia is consolidating or eroding its democratic gains.
International Relations, Strategic Positioning, and Regional Role
Externally, Indonesia under Jokowi has projected continuity in its non-aligned, pragmatic foreign policy, with low levels of acute external tension. Jakarta seeks to balance relations with major powers, especially the United States and China, while emphasizing ASEAN centrality and asserting its role as a leading voice of the Global South. Maritime boundary issues in the North Natuna Sea and concerns about Chinese activities there have led to periodic friction, but Indonesia continues to avoid overt military escalation and manages disputes through diplomacy and calibrated assertion of its rights. Jokowi’s economic agenda has reinforced an outward-looking stance, welcoming foreign investment yet seeking to increase domestic value-added and strategic autonomy. On high-profile issues—such as the Myanmar crisis or great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific—Indonesia tends to advocate dialogue and stability rather than confrontation. Domestic debates about foreign policy are present but relatively muted compared to internal governance questions. As a result, international-relations tensions remain low, and foreign policy is one of the more stable dimensions of Indonesia’s political environment.
Political Polarization and Elite Contestation
Indonesia exhibits moderate but contained polarization, shaped more by elite competition and patronage alignments than by deep, society-wide ideological divides. Under Joko Widodo (Jokowi), partisan and factional rivalries—particularly between pro- and anti-government coalitions and among figures like Prabowo Subianto and Anies Baswedan—have been salient, especially during election cycles. However, these tensions have not generally translated into sustained mass unrest or systematic refusal to accept electoral outcomes. Jokowi’s decision to back Prabowo, his erstwhile rival, and the involvement of his son Gibran Rakabuming Raka on the 2024 presidential ticket were read by critics as reinforcing oligarchic consolidation and blurring government–opposition distinctions, which has fueled a perception of political cynicism and disillusionment among some urban and civil-society actors. Yet, institutional channels for competition remain functional, opposition figures still operate within the system, and broad-based partisan hatred is less intense than in many polarized democracies. Polarization is therefore present and politically significant but falls short of a structural crisis.
Social Cohesion, Identity Politics, and Religious Tensions
Indonesia’s large, diverse population and its history of communal conflict make questions of social cohesion and identity politics particularly sensitive. Since Jokowi’s rise, religious and identity-based mobilization—especially around issues of Islam, minority rights, and perceived insults to religion—has intermittently produced sizable protests, such as the mobilization against former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). Nevertheless, under Jokowi the central state has generally contained spillover into widespread or sustained intercommunal violence. The government has pursued a mix of co-optation and restriction toward Islamist groups, banning or constraining some organizations deemed threatening to Pancasila or national unity. Critics argue that this approach risks conflating legitimate religious activism with extremism and may push some grievances underground. At the same time, mainstream Islamic organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, continue to play stabilizing roles and engage with the state. Overall, social tensions around religion and identity are real and periodically spike, but Indonesia’s pluralist norms and institutionalized religious organizations have so far held them below crisis levels.
Socioeconomic Stability and Development-Related Tensions
Socioeconomic conditions under Jokowi have been characterized by relative macroeconomic stability, moderate growth, and a strong focus on infrastructure and industrial policy, especially in sectors like nickel and downstream processing. These policies have contributed to improvements in connectivity and investment attractiveness, though benefits are unevenly distributed. Social tensions emerge around land acquisition, environmental impacts, labor rights, and regional disparities, particularly in outer islands and resource-rich areas. Protests over labor reforms and local grievances regarding new projects or special economic zones illustrate that development strategies generate localized contention. Nevertheless, there is no widespread economic breakdown or large-scale, sustained unrest directly tied to economic hardship. Social safety nets and poverty reduction schemes have mitigated some pressures, and the overall system retains broad legitimacy as long as growth is maintained. Thus, economic and development-related tensions are visible but remain at a mild to moderate level in comparison with structurally crisis-prone contexts.